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II. ARC UMENT IN REPLY 
A. This Court Possesses Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Hear this Appeal 
The state urges that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because neither the district 
court's order denying Two Jinn's motion to set aside the forfeiture nor its order on Two Jinn's 
motion for reconsideration satisfies the requirements for a final judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(a). Respondent's Brief, p. 4-6. The state fails to mention, however, that 
the district court entered final judgment as described in I.R.C.P. 54(a) on July 13, 2011. 1 
Moreover, both the Idaho Bail Act of 2009 ("Bail Act") and the Idaho Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1, 843 P.2d 151 (1992) establish that the trial court's denial ofa 
motion for relief from forfeiture gives rise to a civil judgment. Accordingly, the state's 
contention that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal is without merit. 
Presumably, the state raises its jurisdictional argument in response to the Supreme 
Court's comments during oral argument on June 3, 2011 in State v. Navarro & Two Jinn, Docket 
No. 37933 ("Navarro"). 2 Navarro is an appeal from an order denying relief from forfeiture, 
which is pending before the Supreme Court on review of the Court of Appeals' opinion. Neither 
counsel for the state, Two Jinn, nor the Court of Appeals had questioned the appellate court's 
jurisdiction in Navarro. Instead, the Supreme Court sua sponte raised whether the order denying 
relief from forfeiture was appealable during oral argument. Since neither party was prepared to 
address the question during argument, the Court ordered subsequent simultaneous briefing. No 
opinion has been issued. 
1 The judgment was augmented into the appellate record on August 25, 2011. 
2 Two Jinn will file a request that this Court judicially notice the court file in Navarro. 
In arguing that the district court's order is not appealable under LA.R. 11 (a)(l ), the state 
appears to combine two distinct questions identified by the Supreme Court during argument in 
Navarro: (l) whether a final judgment within the meaning of I.R.C.P. 54(a) is required; and (2) 
whether an order on a request for relief from forfeiture is a civil judgment appealable under 
I.AR. l l(a) notwithstanding its genesis in a criminal action. Here, the district court entered final 
judgment as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a) and an order denying relief from forfeiture constitutes a 
civil judgment under the Bail Act Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
this appeal. 
1. The requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(a) have been met 
Initially, whether a final judgment is required in bond forfeiture cases is an open question 
until the Supreme Court issues its decision in Navarro. Regardless, the final judgment 
requirement has been met in this case. Two Jiru1' s notice of appeal, which was filed before entry 
of final judgment, became valid when the district court filed the judgment. Idaho Appellate Rule 
17( e )(2) provides: "A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment or order before formal 
written entry of such document shall become valid upon the filing and the placing the stamp of 
the clerk of the court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling the notice of 
appeal." See also Spokane Structures, inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 621, P.3d 
1263, 1268 (20 I 0) (holding Court had jurisdiction based on Notice of Appeal filed prior to final 
judgment where premature Notice of Appeal was filed following motion for summary judgment 
that resolved all of the substantive issues in the case). 
Here, the district court's order on Two Jinn's motion for exoneration and its order on 
Two Jinn's motion to reconsider resolved all substantive issues with respect to Two Jinn's 
2 
liability to remit the forfeiture. Indeed, Two Jinn was obligated to remit the forfeiture or obtain a 
stay of that obligation within five days of the district court's order, notwithstanding the absence 
of a "final" judgment. ,\'ee LC. § 19-2918 (if a motion for exoneration is denied more than 180 
days after the order of forfeiture, then the person posting bail shall pay tbe amount of bail within 
five business days after the entry of the court's order denying the motion absent a stay). Two Jinn 
moved for a stay of its obligation to remit the forfeiture, which the district court granted. R. 
127-35. Shortly after being alerted to the potential need for a final judgment as defined by 
I.R.C.P. 54(a) during the Navarro argument, Two Jinn obtained a final judgment from the district 
court. 
The district court entered final judgment as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a). To the extent Two 
Jinn's prior notice of appeal was invalid for want of such a document, it became valid when the 
judgment was entered. 
2. An order denying a request for relief from forfeiture is a civil judgment 
appealable under I.A.R. 11 (a) notwithstanding its genesis in a criminal action 
During oral argument in Navarro, the Supreme Court questioned how a bail bond 
forfeiture motion filed prior to the Bail Act's enactment in 2009, which under the criminal 
rules of procedure, could give rise to a judgment in a civil action. During oral argument in 
Navarro, Justice Eismann noted that a trial court's denial of a motion to exonerate that arises 
after the Bail Act was enacted would constitute a civil judgment. Argument, 6-3-11, 6:28. 
Unlike the situation in Navarro, the motion at issue here is governed by the Bail Act. 
Prior to 2009, the prosecutor was required to file a civil action to enforce a forfeiture. 
I.C. § 19-2928 (2007). Conversely, the Bail Act obligates the person posting bail to remit the 
forfeiture following the trial court's order on a motion for relief from forfeiture. LC. § 19-2918. 
Accordingly, the district court's order on Two Jinn's request for relief from forfeiture was a civil 
judgment under LC.§ 19-2918 and appealable under I.A.R. l l(a)(l). 
Moreover, Idaho Supreme Court precedent established the appealable nature of orders on 
bail bond motions before the Bail Act. In Rupp, the Court held that a trial court's order on a bail 
agency's motion to exonerate was appealable as "a final order in a civil action" within the scope 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules. Rupp, 123 Idaho at 2, 843 P.2d at 152. The state discounts Rupp 
because the case "pre-dates significant revisions to both I.A.R. l l(a) and I.R.C.P. 54(a)." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 7. Notably absent from the state's argument is any argument identifying 
the amendments3 to which it refers or a description as to the manner in which those amendments 
abrogate Rupp's holding. 
It is possible the state is referring to the 2010 amendments to I.A.R. 11 (a)(l) and I.R.C.P. 
54( a). In 20 l 0, Rule 54( a) was amended to further clarify that a final judgment must be a separate 
document and LA.R. 11 (a)(l) was amended to specify that final judgments as defined in I.R.C.P. 
54(a) are appealable. These amendments do not undermine Rupp's holding that an order on a 
motion for exoneration is appealable as a civil judgment. 
In Rupp, the Court ruled that the question of whether the trial court's order denying the 
motion to exonerate the bond was an appealable order was: 
easily resolved by reference to State v. Fedder, 76 Idaho 535, 285 P.2d 802 (1955). 
In Fedder, in considering the question of the forfeiture of a bail bond, the Court 
said: "The acts of the trial court in forfeiting the undertaking and in refusing, upon 
application, to discharge such forfeiture except upon terms, resulted in a final order 
or judgment from which an appeal would lie." Id. at 542,285 P.2d at 806. 
3 Both LR.C.P. 54 and I.A.R. 11 appear to have been amended four times since Rupp was 
issued in l 992. 
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Rupp, 123 Idaho at 2, 843 P .2d at 152. A motion for relief from forfeiture results in a final order 
appealable as a civil judgment notwithstanding its in a criminal action because bail 
forfeiture "proceedings have no bearing upon the judgment of conviction and are not properly 
before [the appellate court] on an appeal from such judgment." Fedder, 76 Idaho at 542,285 P.2d 
at 806. 
Thus, the proposition for which Rupp stands that an order denying a motion for relief 
from forfeiture is appealable as a civil order although generated in a criminal case is unaffected 
by subsequent amendments defining the particular requirements for a judgment to be "final." 
Indeed, the Rupp Court relied on Fedder notwithstanding the fact that the statute discussed by the 
Fedder Court had since been superceded by the appellate rules. The Rupp Court nonetheless 
adopted the reasoning of the Fedder Court and held that the trial court's order denying 
exoneration of the bond was a final order in a civil action within the scope of the appellate rules. 
A trial court's decision to deny a motion for relief from forfeiture under the Bail Act 
legally obligates the surety to remit the forfeiture. Accordingly, despite being generated in a 
criminal case, such an order gives rise to a civil judgment. To the extent a final judgment meeting 
the specifications ofI.R.C.P. 54(a) is required, such a judgment was entered in this case. The 
state's jurisdictional argument is without merit. 
B. The District Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Exonerate Because the Reinstatement was Ineffectual 
Rivera appeared in court within 180 days of his initial failure to appear, which entitled 
Two Jinn to automatic relief from forfeiture pursuant to LC.§ 19-2922(5). See R. 37-40. The 
prosecutor informed the district court that bond had been set in Rivera's immigration case. R. 38. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor and Rivera stipulated to quash the wa1Tant and reinstate the previously 
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posted bond because Rivera "missed his last court date due to no fault of his own when 
Immigration authorities took him to Utah." R. 44. 
Contrary to the prosecutor's representations, Rivera did not post bond in the immigration 
case and the reinstatement did not secure his release from custody. R. 91. Because Two Jinn 
never re-gained Rivera's custody, there was no release as contemplated by LC. § I 9-29 I 1 and the 
reinstatement \Vas ineffective. With no effective reinstatement, there could be no forfeiture and 
Two Jinn was entitled to relief based on Rivera's prior appearance within 180 days. The district 
court therefore erred in denying Two Jinn's motion for relief from forfeiture as a matter of law. 
In response to Two Jinn's argument, the state notes that LC. § 19-291 I provides that the 
defendant be released from the sheriff's custody without specifying that the release be to the 
custody of the surety. Respondent's Brief, p. 4-5. The state further contends that the Bail Act 
abrogated the common law rule that defendants are delivered into the surety's custody, which is 
discussed in State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 283, 77 P.3d 956, 972 (2003). 
However, the Legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of existing judicial decisions 
when enacting legislation. Cal lies v. O'Neal, 14 7 Idaho 841 , 84 7, 216 P .3d 130, 136 (2009). 
Therefore, this Court presumes the Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless 
the language of the statute clearly indicates otherwise when interpreting a statute. Callies, 14 7 
Idaho at 847,216 P.3d at 136; Thomson v. Ci~y of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,478, 50 P.3d 488,493 
(2002). 
Nothing in the Bail Act is inconsistent with the long-standing common law rule that a 
defendant is released from the custody of the sheriff into the custody of the surety. Indeed, in 
5'heahan, the Court relied in part on the bail's statutory authority to arrest in allirming the jury 
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instruction regarding a bail agent's authority. This authority - the power to arrest the defendant 
for surrender to the sheriff at any place within the state·~ underwent little revision with the Bail 
Act's enactment. Compare I.C. § 19-2925 (2007) with I.C. § 19-2914. 
Section 19-2911 is silent regarding whether the release from the sheriff's custody must be 
to the custody of the surety. Other sections of the Bail Act, including the statutory authority to 
arrest, re-affirm the common law authority that a defendant is released to the surety's custody 
upon his release from jail. The Bail Act certainly does not clearly indicate that the Legislature 
intended to abrogate the common law authority of bail agents. To the contrary, the common law 
authority that a defendant be released into the surety's custody, combined with the statutory 
authority to arrest, requires that I.C. § 19-2911 be read as implicitly requiring that the release from 
the sheriff's custody be to the custody of the surety. 
The state further suggests that "if Two Jinn maintains that the bond reinstatement was 
ineffective, it should be challenging the district court's" order reinstating the bond. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 7, n. l. However, any attempt to appeal from the order of reinstatement would have been 
premature because Two Jinn's liability to remit the forfeiture had not yet been established. For 
instance, following reinstatement, Rivera could have been brought before the district court 
notwithstanding the immigration hold, the case could have resolved and the bond would have 
been exonerated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2922(1 ). Or, the state could have acted on Two Jinn's 
notice of location and secured Rivera's presence in court within 180 days of the forfeiture, which 
would have entitled Two Jinn to exoneration of the bond pursuant I.C. § 19-2922(5). In either 
event, the issue of whether the reinstatement was effective would have been moot. 
In light of the various possible outcomes, relief from forfeiture is sought within 180 days 
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of the forfeiture. See I.C. §§ 19-2917; 19-2922(5). Here, Two Jinn filed a motion for relief from 
forfeiture on alternate grounds: that Rivera was not released from the actual custody of the sheriff 
when the bond was reinstated as required by I.C. § 19-2911 and that justice did not require 
enforcement of the forfeiture. R. 61-62. Whether the district court erred in denying Two Jinn's 
motion on the first basis is at issue in this appeal. Although rulings on bond forfeiture motions 
are generally discretionary determinations, the interpretation of LC. § 19-2911 is a question of law 
over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Dana, 148 Idaho 752, 755, 228 P.3d 
1019, 1022 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Brown, 148 Idaho 706,708,228 P.3d 387,389 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
Rivera was not released from the sheriff's custody to that of the surety as contemplated by 
Section 19-2911 and, therefore, the reinstatement of the previously posted bail bond was 
ineffective. With no effective reinstatement, the second forfeiture was invalid and Two Jinn was 
entitled to relief based on Rivera's prior appearance within 180 days. The district court therefore 
erred in denying Two Jinn's motion for relief from forfeiture as a matter oflaw. 
C. Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion in Finding that Justice did not 
Require it to Set Aside the Forfeiture is not Before the Court as an Issue on Appeal 
Two Jinn did not identify whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that 
justice did not require it to set aside the forfeiture as an issue on appeal and presented no argument 
on that issue. Appellant's Brief. Instead, Two Jinn's sole issue on appeal is whether the district 
court erred as a matter of law in denying Two Jinn's motion because the reinstatement was 
ineffective. Any ambiguity as to whether Two Jinn nonetheless somehow intended to present the 
issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion under I.C.R. 
46(h)(l) was resolved by a footnote in the Appellant's Brief, where Two Jinn noted that certain 
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"findings occur in the district court's analysis of whether justice required enforcement of the 
forfeiture - a ruling Two Jinn does not challenge on appeal." Appellant's Brief, p. 4 n.2; see also 
Respondent's Brief, p. 8. 
Curiously, the state nonetheless devotes several pages to its argument that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that justice required enforcement of the forfeiture. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 8-12. As this issue is not before the Court, no reply to the state's 
extraneous argument is warranted. 
D. The State is not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Attorney fees are permissible on appeal to the prevailing party in a civil action. LC. § 
21. Attorney fees under Section 12-121 are only appropriate if the case was brought, pursued 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. LR.C.P. 54(e)(1); see also 
Anderson v. Goodlijfe, 140 Idaho 446,450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 (2004). Legitimate issues concerning 
the district court's interpretation of laws do not result in an award of attorney fees. Anderson, 140 
Idaho at 450, 95 P.3d at 68. 
The state claims that it is entitled to attorney fees because "Two Jinn had an obligation to 
ensure jurisdiction was proper prior to filing this appeal." Respondent's Brief, p. 12. This 
argument is unfounded for a number of reasons. Notably, Two Jinn obtained a final judgment 
from the district court shortly after being alerted to the potential issue during the Navarro 
argument. Although final judgment was entered more than a month before the state filed its brief 
a fact readily ascertainable from the online repository - the state failed to mention that judgment 
had been entered in its brief. That the state pursued its jmisdictional argument and request for 
attorney without verifying the status of the district court record is in itself frivolous. 
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Second, this appeal was filed in March 2011. Before oral argument in Navarro on June 3, 
2011, neither counsel for the state, the Court of Appeals, nor Two Jinn had questioned the 
appcalable nature of trial court orders on motions to exonerate. See Navarro, Docket No. 36339, 
(Ct. App. May 19, 2010); State v. Bardsley, 150 Idaho 264,245 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(appeal after district court entered a memorandum decision and order denying the motion for 
exoneration); State v. Vargas, 141 Idaho 485,485, 111 P.3d 621, 621 (Ct. App. 2005) (appeal 
from the district court's order denying motions to exonerate a bail bond). Supreme Court 
precedent held that trial court orders on motions to exonerate are appealable as civil judgments. 
Rupp, 123 Idaho at 2, 843 P.2d at 152. There was no reason to question the Court's jurisdiction at 
the time this appeal was filed. 
Finally, unlike Navarro, Two Jim1's motion was filed under the Bail Act. During 
argument in Navarro, the Court opined that an order denying relief from forfeiture gives rise to a 
civil judgment under the Bail Act. Of course, prior to a ruling in Navarro, the exact nature of this 
Court's jurisdiction in these cases is unclear. Nevertheless, particularly in light of the Court's 
suggestion that jurisdiction would exist under the Bail Act, Two Jim1's choice to obtain a final 
judgment and continue this appeal pending a decision Navarro was certainly not unreasonable. 
The state further faults Two Jinn for not addressing the jurisdictional "deficiency" in its 
opening brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 12-13. Since Rupp, which clearly holds that orders on 
motions for relief from forfeiture are appeal able, no Idaho appellate court has addressed its 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from denials ofrelief from forfeiture. Two Jinn's motion arose under 
the new Bail Act and it addressed the concerns expressed by the Court during the Navarro 
argument by obtaining a final judgment. It is unclear why Two Jinn would raise what it views as 
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a non issue in its opening brief, particularly prior to any ruling in Navarro. 
The I3ail Act f daho Appellate Rules I I (a)(]) and 17( e )(2) and this Court's precedent all 
establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, which presents a valid 
question of statutory interpretation. If the state does in fact prevail on this appeal, it would not be 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Two Jinn respectfully asks that this Court vacate the district court's judgment holding it 
liable on the bail bond and enter an order exonerating the bond. Two Jinn further asks that this 
Court deny the state's request to dismiss the appeal and to award attorney fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 day of September 2011. 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _J_ day of September, 2011, I caused two true and 
conect copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: 
Office of the Attorney General 
Civil Litigation Unit 
Andrew Snook 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
12 
